Allow aborting liquidity purchases after signing #3206
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When a liquidity purchase is signed, we eagerly add it to our DB before receiving the remote `interactive-tx` signatures. If we reach that step, our peer should always finalize the signing steps, so we didn't bother handling the case where they would instead send `tx_abort`. When that happened, we kept the upstream HTLCs pending until they got close to their expiry, at which point we failed them. We've seen cases where seemingly non-malicious mobile wallets abort that kind of liquidity purchases after a disconnection. It is harmful for an honest sender to keep the HTLCs pending, so we now immediately fail them in that case.
pm47
approved these changes
Nov 5, 2025
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When a liquidity purchase is signed, we eagerly add it to our DB before receiving the remote
interactive-txsignatures. If we reach that step, our peer should always finalize the signing steps, so we didn't bother handling the case where they would instead sendtx_abort. When that happened, we kept the upstream HTLCs pending until they got close to their expiry, at which point we failed them.We've seen cases where seemingly non-malicious mobile wallets abort that kind of liquidity purchases after a disconnection. It is harmful for an honest sender to keep the HTLCs pending, so we now immediately fail them in that case.